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Introduction
In political science, terrorist organisations are categorised as collective po-
litical actors. They constitute formalised institutions which possess a specific 
structure, leaders, ideology, programme, values, and preferences. Unlike public 
institutions or political parties, they operate outside the law1. The influence of the 
terrorist phenomenon on political communication processes has been growing, 
however, it constitutes a multi-faceted issue, the interpretation of which is often 
difficult2. Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism stresses the difficulty in offering 
a clear definition of the essence of terrorism, though he does attempt to indicate 
its characteristics. According to him, it should be considered as a political con-
cept3. He posits that only through that, could one understand the goals and the 
motivation behind terrorism, and differentiate it from other forms of violence. 
Katarzyna Maniszewska, a Polish political and media scientist, has noted that 
many international documents, e.g. the Declaration on Combating Terrorism of 
12 December 1995, do not offer a definition of terrorism4. The subject literature 
includes various attempts at a systemic classification of terrorism. For example, 
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 1 B. Dobek-Ostrowska, “Komunikowanie polityczne i publiczne”, PWN, Warsaw 2012, p. 169.
 2 M. Madej, “Międzynarodowy terroryzm polityczny”, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 
Warsaw 2001, pp. 5–8.
 3 B. Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism”, Columbia University Press, New York 2006, p. 2; cf. also 
R. Borkowski, “Terroryzm ponowoczesny. Studium z antropologii polityki”, Wydawnictwo Adam 
Marszałek, Torun 2006, pp. 37–40.
 4 K. Maniszewska, “Terroryzm a media. Środki masowego przekazu i literatura a rozwój 
terroryzmu w Republice Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1968–1998”, Oficyna Wydawnicza „Atut” 
– Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe, Wroclaw 2006, p. 22.
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the FBI, a part of the security system of the USA, defines it as “the unlawful use 
of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a govern-
ment, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives”5. Marek Madej stresses that acts of terrorism are voluntary 
and intentional acts6. Political scientists have tried to classify terrorist organisa-
tions. They have indicated, e.g. ideological terrorism (representatives of that in-
cluded Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong), ethnic-nationalist terrorism (e.g. the IRA, 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and political-religious terrorism (Hamas Islamic 
Resistance Movement, The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine)7. That classifi-
cation refers to the motivations behind the actions of those organisations8. Terror-
ism proves to be an ambiguous notion which depends on the specific location and 
time in history, and considering the fact that it is studied by the representatives 
of various sciences who assume different starting points for their deliberations, 
it should not be surprising how difficult it is for researchers to indicate the most 
representative and academically proper approach9.
An important problem regarding terrorist organisations is their manner of 
communication with the world through the mass media. The media – terrorism 
relationship is particularly valid for how public opinion perceives terrorist activi-
ties.10 Terrorism constitutes a form of political communication which transcends 
constitutional procedures. It is planned with the aim of exerting a psychological ef-
fect on the authorities and society, which is why the mass media are a sine qua non 
condition for publicising acts of terror11. Reports on attacks almost instantaneously 
become global news. In just a few moments’ time after an attack, millions of view-
ers and internet users become included in a special media spectacle. That applied 
to the Al-Qaeda 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the attacks on the Moscow 
Dubrovka Theatre committed on 23–26 October 2002 by a Chechen combat force 
led by Movsar Basayev, and the series of terrorist attacks on trains in Madrid on 
11 March 2004. The media are a source of information on attacks, which does not 
mean they approve of them or legitimise such actions. The attackers realise the role 
of the means of communication, which is why they send their statements to the 
media, or use social media and their own websites to post applicable information. 
Thus, terrorist organisations want to draw the attention of the global public to the 
 5 R. Gunaratna, G. Steven, “Counter-Terrorism: A Reference Handbook”, ABC-CLIO, Santa 
Barbara, California 2004, p. 6.
 6 M. Madej, op. cit., p. 7.
 7 R. Gunaratna, G. Steven, op. cit., pp. 8–10.
 8 M. Madej, op. cit., pp. 22–30.
 9 K. Maniszewska, op. cit., pp. 23–25.
 10 B. Nacos, “Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Coun-
terterrorism”, Lanham, Maryland 2007, pp. 179–192; B. Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 173–228.
 11 A. Peresin, “Mass media and Terrorism”, Medijska istraživanja 2007, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 7, 16–18, 
[5–22] http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/28073 [accessed on: 27.01.2017]; B. Dobek-Ostrowska, op. cit., p. 176.
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motivations behind their actions12. The media are perceived by those responsible 
for terrorism as a means of focusing the attention of the receivers ensuring a high 
level of sensationalism13. Therefore, there is a threat that together with the increase 
of the interest of the media and journalists in the attacks, terrorists will view such 
a mode of political communication as a form of auto-promotion or advertising, and 
their activities will escalate. In 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe passed a recommendation where they warned journalists against their 
work being used by terrorists for fulfilling their own needs14.
The significance of the media in reporting terrorist attacks can also be ex-
pressed in exerting pressure on the authorities to quickly introduce relevant deci-
sions15. However, Marek Madej has noted that the media contribute to a minor 
degree to gaining popularity and political support by terrorist groups. Moreover, 
attacks in which innocent people die are condemned by the journalistic com-
munity, and in no way could one talk about any social acceptance for such be-
haviour16. Also, the media can help in combating terrorist organisations by pub-
lishing amongst the general public, the identity and the photographs of persons 
suspected of having conducted an attack.
The role of the media in reporting on terrorist attacks confirms the gravity of 
the phenomenon of mediatisation of political communication, in which the media 
fulfil a two-fold function: of a primary and a secondary sender. On the one hand, 
they become a channel transporting information without altering the message. On 
the other, they interpret the message being sent. Teresa Sasińska-Klas emphasises 
the existence of three paradigms closely related to the mediatisation process: the 
commonness paradigm, the paradigm of the symbolic world, and the paradigm 
of the relationship between the media and social changes17. In regard to the media 
– terrorism relationship, the concept appears as follows: the everyday operations 
of terrorist organisations are associated with and depend on mediatised commu-
nication (terrorist organisations communicate both amongst themselves using 
new communication technologies, and through the mass media, particularly the 
internet, there occurs an exchange of information between terrorists and society) 
 12 B. Dobek-Ostrowska, op. cit., p. 176.
 13 A. Mroczek, “Media”, in: “Terroryzm. Anatomia zjawiska”, K. Liedel (ed.), Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2006, pp. 240–243.
 14 T. Goban-Klas, “Dziennikarze i terroryści – przeciwnicy czy wspólnicy?”, in: “Między od-
powiedzialnością a sensacją. Dziennikarstwo i edukacja na przełomie wieków”, K. Wolny-Zmo-
rzyński, M. Wrońska, W. Furman (eds.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszow 
2006, p. 22.
 15 D. Altheide, “The mass media and terrorism”, Discourse & Communication 2007, Issue 1 (3), 
pp. 287–308.
 16 M. Madej, op. cit., p. 20.
 17 T. Sasińska-Klas, “Mediatyzacja a medializacja sfery publicznej”, Zeszyty Prasoznawcze 
2014, Issue 2, pp. 164–166.
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Terrorist organisations are viewed through the signs, symbols, and slogans which 
are communicated to the public by the media (e.g. the Islamic State terrorist or-
ganisation is usually presented with an image of a black-and-white flag). Ter-
rorists could not exist without the media, which is why they use the media for 
fulfilling their goals, and informing society about their activities. The media are 
an important and necessary forum of public discussion on terrorist organisations.
Research methodology
I attempt to answer the question whether in the times of the mediatisation 
of political communication, which in turn means the mediatisation of the 
communication of the activities of terrorist organisations, the basic principles of 
journalistic ethics have been observed. The case study covered the press ripples 
to the series of terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. The study material 
included Polish opinion-making weeklies Newsweek Polska and Polityka, and 
national dailies: Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, in their printed versions. 
The analysis covered all press texts which included at least one of the following 
terms: terroryzm (terrorism), zamachy terrorystyczne (terrorist attacks), agresja 
(aggression), przemoc (violence), brutalizm (brutality), Państwo Islamskie (the 
Islamic State), islam (Islam), and the word Paryż (Paris), paryskie (Paris used 
as an adjective) or Francja (France). The scope of the study covered the period 
from 1 November 2015 to 11 December 2015. Thus I gained a representative study 
sample, which enabled me to establish whether the topic of the terrorist threat in 
France had appeared in the Polish press prior to 13 Nov 2015, and I could form an 
objective evaluation of the standards of journalistic work.
The above-mentioned methodological criteria were met by: 5 press articles 
published in Polityka, 7 texts published in Newsweek Polska, 52 texts published 
in Gazeta Wyborcza and 55 texts published in Rzeczpospolita18.
Quantitative and qualitative analysis
The study consisted of a quantitative and a qualitative analysis, the goal 
of which was to define whether the reporting on the Paris attacks respected the 
two main journalistic principles: the truth and the objectivity principles. Those 
principles are included in international regulations on journalistic ethics (the 
 18 In total, 109 press texts met the methodological criteria.
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code of the International Union of Press Associations of 1936, the International 
Federation of Journalists of 1939, the Paris Declaration of 1983, Resolution No. 
1003 of the Plenary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 1993)19, journalistic 
ethical codes (e.g. the declaration on the principles of the International Federation 
of Journalists passed before the 2nd Congress of the International Federation of 
Journalists in 1954)20. The codes of conduct of Polish associations, and extra-
association regulations of professional conduct in Poland also include those 
basic journalistic principles (e.g. the Code of Journalistic Conduct of the Polish 
Journalists’ Association of 2001, the Journalistic Code of Conduct of the 
Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland of 1991, the Media Ethics 
Charter of 1995, and the Journalistic Code of Conduct of the Conference of the 
Polish Media of 2002)21.
I shall juxtapose the theoretical approach of specific principles of journalistic 
ethics with their practical applications in the analysed press texts.
The truth principle
The truth principle requires journalists, publishers, producers, and broad-
casters to make every effort to ensure that the communicated information is true, 
and that the facts are reported reliably, without any distortions, in the appropriate 
context, and, in the event of an erroneous piece of information, that they introduce 
corrections immediately22.
Based on that understanding of the journalistic truth principle, one can 
identify a significant criterion for the evaluation of whether a press release 
observes it or not. That applies to the efforts on the part of the journalists seeking 
truth, and their scrupulousness in reporting, which is also expressed in correcting 
possible mistakes and defaming facts.
On 13 November 2015, Paris was the site of a series of terrorist attacks for 
which responsibility was claimed by Islamic State23. I believe that the study 
 19 I. Fiut, “Spory o etykę mediów”, in: “Spór o etykę. Materiały X Jagiellońskiego Sympozjum 
Etycznego. Kraków, 4–5 czerwca 1998”, J. Pawlica (ed.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagielloń-
skiego, Krakow 1999, pp. 66–67; I. Dobosz, “Prawo i etyka w zawodzie dziennikarza”, Oficyna 
Ekonomiczna Grupa Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2008, pp. 109–115.
 20 I. Dobosz, op. cit., pp. 115–116.
 21 Ibid., pp. 124–129, 131–137.
 22 “Karta Etyczna Mediów” (Media Ethics Charter), http://www.radaetykimediow.pl/index.
php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=2&Itemid=3 [accessed on: 27.01.2017]; 
I. Dobosz, op. cit., p. 132.
 23 E. Knecht, “Islamic State says France remains top target”, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-france-shooting-claim-idUSKCN0T30LL20151114 [accessed on: 27.01.2017] (“Islamic State 
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question whether Polish opinion-making weeklies Newsweek Polska and Polityka 
and dailies Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza observed the journalistic truth 
principle, can receive a firm affirmative answer for several reasons.
The first reason was the number of texts within the period directly following 
the attacks, which showed journalistic care consisting of making every effort to 
report reliably on the events in Paris. In the week following the attacks, 16–22 Nov 
2015, 39 texts were published in Gazeta Wyborcza (a total of 15 texts in the issue of 
16 Nov 2015), and 45 texts were published in Rzeczpospolita (18 texts in the issue 
of 16 Nov 2015) regarding the events in Paris24. Two issues of opinion-making 
weeklies published following the attacks included Newsweek Polska – 1 text in 
issue 47/2015 and 5 texts in issue 48/2015; and Polityka – 1 text in issue 47/2017 
and 2 texts in issue 48/2015. It might seem somewhat surprising that within 
the period of 1 Nov–13 Nov 2015, the periodicals did not include any texts on the 
terrorist threat on the part of Islamic State in relation to the capital of France where 
only a few months prior, in January 2015, there had occurred terrorist attacks in 
the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. That might confirm 
the assumption that the Polish press considered it a unique and isolated event. On 
the other hand, the lack of interest on the part of the press in the topic of possible 
acts of terror in France could be explained by the lengthy period (10 months) that 
had elapsed since January 2015.
The other reason which shows that the editors of the analysed periodicals 
made every effort to observe the journalistic truth principle were the detailed 
accounts of the Paris terrorist attacks and the interviews with specialists on Islam 
and terrorism25.
claimed responsibility on Saturday for attacks that killed 127 people in Paris, saying it sent mili-
tants strapped with suicide bomb belts and carrying machine guns to various locations in the 
heart of the capital”); M. Castillo, M. Haddad, M. Martinez, S. Almasy, CNN, “Paris suicide 
bomber identified; ISI claims responsibility for 129 dead”, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/14/
world/paris-attacks/index.html [accessed on: 27.01.2017] (“ISIS claimed responsibility for the hor-
rific Paris attacks, for which France vowed revenge”); J. Gunter, Y. Lukov, T. Poole, H. Low, 
E. Harrison, T. Spender, “Paris attacks: as they happened”, http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-
europe-34815972 [accessed on: 27.01.2017] (“Islamic State claims responsibility for attacks in of-
ficial statement”).
 24 16 November 2015 was the first day when it was possible to include press reports on the ter-
rorist attacks of 13 November 2015. Considering the fact that the attacks began on Friday the 13th 
of Nov in the evening, it is no surprise that the first press reactions in dailies in printed versions 
could only be found on Monday the 16th of Nov.
 25 Press reports from France included, e.g.:
J. Bielecki, “Nowa religia nadziei dla francuskich przedmieść”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 30.11, p. A10.
J. Bielecki, “Śmiertelny wyścig z dżihadem”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 19.11, p. A9.
A. Słojewska, “Dżihad wprost z Brukseli”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 17.11, p. A6.
P. Moszyński, “Co planowali terroryści z Paryża”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 26.11, p. 11.
T. Bielecki, “Paryż szuka sojuszników”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 24.11, p. 12.
P. Moszyński, “Dossier terrorystów z Paryża”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 17.11, p. 10.
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The objectivity principle
The objectivity principle is expressed in the alignment of a journalistic 
report with the actual status of the discussed object or phenomenon. Therefore, 
the author presents the reality regardless of her/his views, and reliably reports 
on various points of view26. If a journalist is supposed to cope with the challenge 
of objective description of reality, she/he must, first of all, consider the well-
known “5Ws” journalistic principle as a foundation of her/his work. According 
to it, she/he must answer the five questions: who, where, when, why, what27. 
Secondly, the author of a press text ought to present events in the appropriate 
context, which includes organising individual pieces of information, and their 
most complete interpretation. The objectivity principle must therefore assume an 
aggiornamento, i.e. correcting the theory through applying it to an ever increasing 
M. Czarnecki, “132 ofiary terrorystów. Większość zidentyfikowano”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 
16.11, p. 3.
[editorial board], “Tragiczne zamachy w Paryżu”, Newsweek Polska 2015, Issue 47, 16.11–22.11, p. 4.
M. Nowicki, “Paryż w stanie wojennym”, Newsweek Polska 2015, Issue 48, 23.11–29.11, pp. 62–68.
M. Ostrowski, J. Winiecki, Ł. Wójcik, “Szarość, czerń i biel”, Polityka 2015, Issue 47, 18.11.–24.11, 
pp. 6–8.
The theme of Islam and the problem of terrorism were discussed in the following press texts:
P. Jendroszczyk, “Boko Haram ocieka krwią”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 20.11, p. A13.
P. Jendroszczyk, “Izrael ignoruje dżihadystów”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 19.11, p. A10.
J. Bielecki (interview with Alain Finkielkraut), “Fala uchodźców wygna Żydów z Francji”, Rzecz-
pospolita 2015, 18.11, p. A12.
M. Zawadzki (interview with Brian Katulis), “To był szczyt możliwości kalifatu”, Gazeta Wybor-
cza 2015, 16.11, p. 4.
R. Stefanicki (interview with Piotr Balcerowicz), “Państwo Islamskie. Dlaczego oni wygrywają”, 
Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 21.11–22.11, pp. 12–14.
K. Staszak (interview with Thomas Guénolé), “Liberté. A gdzie fraternité i égalité. Apartheid à la 
française”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 21.11–22.11, pp. 16–17.
A. Dębowska (interview with Krzysztof Rutkowski), “Paryża nie da się zniszczyć”, Gazeta Wy-
borcza 2015, 20.11, pp. 30–31.
J. Pawlicki, “Terroryści w Brukseli”, Newsweek Polska 2015, Issue 48, 23.11–29.11, pp. 72–74.
M. Kacewicz, “Dżihadystan”, Newsweek Polska 2015, Issue 48, 23.11–29.11, pp. 75–77.
T. Targański, “Ogień zwalczany ogniem”, Polityka 2015, Issue 49, 2.12–8.12, pp. 64–66.
Piotr Jendroszczyk is a permanent collaborator of the foreign affairs department of Rzeczpospo-
lita, previously a Berlin and Moscow correspondent. Alain Finkielkraut is a French writer, phi-
losopher, essayist, a member of The Académie française, and a long-term commentator on social 
phenomena in France. Piotr Balcerowicz is a professor at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Univer-
sity of Warsaw. Thomas Guénolé is a French political scientist working at the Paris Institute of 
Political Studies.
 26 “Karta Etyczna Mediów”; I. Dobosz, op. cit., p. 132.
 27 P. Lewandowski, “Creative writing informacyjnych tekstów dziennikarskich”, Wydawni-
ctwo internetowe e-bookowo, 2014, pp. 55–56.
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collection of new facts28. Thus to be objective in the journalistic sense means to 
possess the skills of collecting material and assigning it specific meaning29. The 
above-mentioned principles may be visible, and the degree of their fulfilment 
can be evaluated based on the comprehensive narration of a periodical. That 
would mean an evaluation of the implementation of the journalistic objectivity 
principle, which is verified through the analysis of a series of press publications. 
Then, individual press texts are treated as elements forming a mosaic, a bigger 
whole, which possesses an inherent coherence of the series of the publications 
or a lack of it.
Therefore, I ventured to specify whether the analysed dailies Rzeczpospolita 
and Gazeta Wyborcza and opinion-making weeklies Newsweek Polska and 
Polityka considered in the form and content of their texts what happened in Paris 
the general experience and the cognitive horizon of the terrorist attacks, whether 
they included various contexts of the tragic events of 13 November 2015 in which 
they could be interpreted, i.e. had the previously mentioned aggiornamento 
taken place. I believe that by answering those questions, it will be possible to 
specify whether the analysed periodicals respected the objectivity principle. One 
should also add that the applied approach of journalistic objectivity corresponds 
to the synthesis of the concepts of functional objectivity, actual objectivity, and 
consensus as developed by Wolfgang Donsbach30.
Fulfilling the 5Ws principle
All of the analysed periodicals fulfilled the journalistic 5Ws principle. The texts 
informed the reader what happened on 13 November 2015 in Paris (what)31, provided 
a detailed account of the events, information about the organisation and the names of 
 28 W. Furman, “Obserwator czy uczestnik? Dwa podejścia do obiektywizmu dziennikarskie-
go”, Polityka i Społeczeństwo 2012, Issue 9, p. 100, http://www.politologia.univ.rzeszow.pl/uploa-
dUC/PiS/nr%209/artykuly/Wojciech_Furman.pdf [accessed on: 27.01.2017].
 29 Ibid., pp. 100–101.
 30 M. Kunczik, A. Zipfel, “Publizistik. Ein Studienbuch”, Böhlau Verlag, Köln 2001, p. 279 
as quoted in W. Furman, op. cit., p. 102.
 31 I shall quote selected fragments of the press texts which explain to the reader what happened 
in Paris on 13 Nov 2015: “The French people are showing their unity and courage after the attacks: 
a large crowd marched behind a banner with the Paris motto: Fluctuat nec mergitur – tossed but 
not sunk” (M. Ostrowski, J. Winiecki, Ł. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 6.); “It is estimated that over 150 
people died in Friday evening’s terrorist attacks in Paris” ([editors], op. cit., p. 4.); “At least 129 
people died at five locations in the capital. It is the biggest terrorist attack in the country to date. 
The Islamists first struck on Friday at 9:20 p.m. At that time, one of the terrorists blew himself up 
near the Stade de France where a football match between France and Germany was taking place” 
(J. Bielecki, “Wojna w centrum Paryża”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 16.11, p. A3).
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those responsible for the attack (who)32, precise time references of the terrorist attacks 
(when)33 and their location (where)34, as well as the reasons for the attacks (why)35.
The context of the reported events
The reported events of 13 November 2015 and the situation in France after the ter-
rorist attacks were presented in different contexts, i.a. in the political context (the policy 
of president François Hollande, political groups in France, relations with Russia and the 
 32 I quote some fragments of the press texts which confirmed the who category in relation to the 
analysed topic (who performed the terrorist attacks): “The Friday attacks were the biggest attacks in 
France since WWII. At least 132 people died, and approx. 350 were injured. ‘It was an act of war. It was 
committed by Islamic State’, president François Hollande announced. Soon afterwards, jihadists took 
responsibility for the attack” (T. Bielecki, “Zamach na Europę”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 16.11, p. 1).
 33 The when was represented in the following press texts: [AP, Reuters, BBC], “Kalendarium 
zamachów w Paryżu”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 16.11, pp. 4–5; J. Bielecki, “Francja się zachwiała”, 
Rzeczpospolita 2015, 16.11, p. A1; J. Bielecki, “Wojna w centrum Paryża”, op. cit., p. A3.
 34 The following are some of the fragments of press texts referring to the where category: “At 9:25 
p.m. a three-person unit driving a black Seat killed 15 people in front of the Le Carillon cafe-bar and 
the Le Petit Cambodge restaurant, at 9:32 p.m. five people in the garden of Café Bonne Bière, and 
at 9:36 p.m. the same assassins shot at the guests sitting on the patio of the La Belle Equipe restau-
rant, killing 19 people and severely injuring 9. The attack on the Stade de France where a friendly 
game with Germany was being held and the president was present in the stands (and where in seven 
months’ time Euro 2016 is to commence), and on the Bataclan theatre were more thought through. 
At the stadium, the plan clearly fell apart and two attackers detonated their suicide belts. At Bataclan 
(the previous owner of which was considered pro-Israel), where hostages were held and which was 
eventually assaulted, the most people died. As we are writing this, there are a total of 129 casualties 
and over 350 injured” (M. Ostrowski, J. Winiecki, Ł. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 6).
 35 The why was represented in the following press texts: “Islamic State stated its strategy in the 
February issue of the Dabiq magazine. Its promoters wrote there that “the goal of goals” is to eliminate 
the grey zone. It includes all those who have not declared yet whether they support good or evil, mean-
ing Allah or they oppose the Prophet. The jihadists are so efficient in Syria and Iraq because they take 
advantage of all local fissions: ethnic, tribal and religious, to remove the grey zone. ‘A divided commu-
nity where hatred evokes fear is the perfect area for recruiting new fighters’, wrote the wise men of IS” 
(M. Ostrowski, J. Winiecki, Ł. Wójcik, op. cit., pp. 6–7); “It is the poverty and a lack of any prospects in 
the French suburbs that thrust young people into the hands of Islamic extremists. […] At the same time, 
according to an April report by the French Senate, approx. 1,430 out of 3,000 Europeans in total who 
fight in jihadist units in Syria and Iraq are French nationals. And many of those are actually inhabitants 
of the so-called banlieues – the poor suburbs of French cities dominated by immigrants. It does not take 
much for the young people frustrated with their lack of any prospects to believe that if they join jihad, 
all their problems will be solved” (M. Rębała, “Nie dyskryminować, tylko rewitalizować”, Gazeta 
Wyborcza 2015, 16.11, p. 6); “At least we know why it was us who were attacked – because France was 
the only country in Europe apart from the United Kingdom to possess a fully-fledged defence system. 
And the UK, which made a mistake supporting George Bush regarding Iraq in 2003, has withdrawn 
to its island. No other EU Member State apart from France sends its troops to fight jihad” (I. Guetta, 
“Wiemy, dlaczego to nas zaatakowano”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 16.11, p. 2).
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EU, the attitude of Polish political groups towards the Paris attacks and the presence 
of Muslims in Europe), the historical context (previous acts of terrorism which had oc-
curred in France), the cultural and social context (France as a model of an open society, 
the issue of immigration and refugees, the ripples of the events of 13 Nov 2015 in other 
European states), and the religious context (the essence of Islam and jihad).
The political context
A few press texts associated the acts of terror of 13 Nov 2015 with the in-
creasing support for Marine Le Pen’s National Front:
The leader of the National Front is actually using the effect: “I told you so.” She just 
stated that “whatever the EU would do, France has to define its policy on its own,” 
and demanded ad hoc measures to “annihilate Islamic extremism.” Nicolas Sarkozy, 
the leader of the largest opposition party, has to struggle through such slogans propa-
gated by right-wingers. He demands severe punishments even for those who browse 
jihadist websites. He also accuses the government of not being up to the task, and 
thus he suggests extensive corrections to French foreign policy: Putin, as the former 
French president has been stating for a long time now, is our ally in Syria. Without 
Russia we will not succeed in the fight against Daesh (Daesh is the scornfully-sound-
ing Arabic acronym of Islamic State), neither will we become successful in coping 
with other major challenges posed before the international community36.
“The National Front means the return of Vichy France,” warned Jean-Christophe 
Cambadélis, leader of the socialist party. In the first leg of the regional elections, can-
didates of the FN, the leader of which is Marine Le Pen, won first place in six out of 
12 regions (excluding Corsica). It is true that they never acquired an absolute major-
ity (in opinion polls, the FN received on average less than 30 percent of votes nation-
wide) nonetheless it was the highest result the party has ever gained, much better than 
that of the two mainstream parties: the ruling socialists and Sarkozy’s Republicans37.
[On Sunday] the French went to vote in regional elections, which usually receive 
little attention, yet after the terrorist attacks they gained new significance. The vote 
became a trial of the rule of the socialists, and a test of the popularity of the extreme 
right-wing National Front38.
 36 M. Ostrowski, J. Winiecki, Ł. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 8.
 37 M. Ostrowski, “Front przeciw Frontowi”, Polityka 2015, Issue 50, 09.12–15.12, p. 6.
 38 M. Rębała, “Strach pcha Francję na prawo”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 07.12, p. 12.
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“The Paris attacks were a gift from the heavens for them. They help PiS (Law and 
Justice) as they fuel xenophobia. And Poles dislike foreigners, they do not want 
them in their backyards,” said Jerzy Skoczylas, a Krakow-based journalist. He was 
shocked with the outright joy with which right-wing journalists wrote that the French 
had only got what they deserved! It serves them right since they have been letting 
immigrants in for years!39
PiS officials are covertly backing out of what Konrad Szymański, the expected new 
minister for European affairs, said right after the Paris attacks when he announced 
that Poland shall not fulfil the EU arrangements regarding receiving immigrants40. 
In France, the state of emergency has just been extended. It is supposed to last 
three months. In Saint-Denis, a successful man hunt was carried out, during which 
the organiser of the attacks of 13 November died. French fighters are bombing the 
capital of the Islamic caliphate. “In these circumstances, not only mainstream right-
wingers, but also the National Front will have trouble criticising the government 
and the president. It is clear that it is Hollande who holds the front line in the fight 
against Islamic State, both domestically and abroad. And that considerably limits 
Marine Le Pen’s choices,” said Guetta. Just like many other French, he also wants 
to believe in Hollande. The problem is that after the previous attacks or after the 
intervention in Mali in 2013, the ratings of the socialist president rose for a moment 
only to fall once again41.
Guy Sorman noted that the terrorist attacks in Paris should be viewed as 
a political victory for Russia, and in the context of the long-term negligence of the 
French and Belgian internal policies, and their passivity in the face of the “huge 
crowd of candidates ready to die a martyr’s death in Europe”42.
Gazeta Wyborcza reported on a demonstration of Poznań nationalists who 
opposed the presence of Muslims in Poland, and on the reaction of Muslims:
“It was a great pain to see the attacks in Paris unfold. But it also pains us to see that 
some Poles blame us for that,” said a Poznań-based imam during a Muslim demon-
stration. […] During their demonstration, nationalists in Mickiewicz Square chanted: 
Polska wielka, Polska biała, bez Murzyna i pedała! (Great Poland, White Poland, 
without Niggers or Queers!), Wielka Polska, katolicka! (Great Catholic Poland!), Nie 
 39 R. Kim, E. Lis, “Wcześniej się nie zdarzyło”, Newsweek Polska 2015, Issue 48, 23.11–29.11, 
p. 33.
 40 P. Wroński, “PiS szokuje w sprawie uchodźców”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 16.11, p. 7.
 41 M. Nowicki, “Paryż w stanie wojennym”, op. cit., p. 68.
 42 M. Nowicki (interview with Guy Sorman), “Wygrał Putin i terroryści”, Newsweek Polska 
2015, Issue 48, 23.11–29.11, pp. 70–71.
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tęczowa, nie czerwona, tylko Polska narodowa! (Not a Rainbow, Nor Red, but a Na-
tionalist Poland!), Polska tylko dla Polaków! (Poland only for Poles!), Ewangelia, 
a nie Koran! (The Scripture not the Quran!)43.
Gazeta Wyborcza indicated that the terrorist attacks in Paris were used by 
Central Asian authoritarian regimes to limit civil liberties:
On Wednesday, the parliament of Tajikistan passed amendments to the act on com-
bating terrorism. Now, in the event of a terrorist threat, the secret service can block 
the internet and cellular lines – both in selected locations and nationwide44.
Rzeczpospolita presented the proposal made by PiS regarding the radicalisa-
tion of the positions regarding refugees by the EU Member States in the context 
of the Paris attacks45.
Historical context
The article by Tomasz Targański entitled “Ogień zwalczany ogniem” dis-
cussed a bloody attack on a passenger train on 18 Jun 1961 in the context of the 
French-Algerian conflict, the activities of the Organisation armée secrète, and 
the National Liberation Front46.
In Paris, the word “war” keeps reappearing – it is present on the front pages of news-
papers and in everyday discussions. In a dramatic speech delivered soon after the 
attacks, President François Hollande used it more than 10 times. The state of emer-
gency was introduced for the first time since 1961 when extreme right-winged gener-
als attempted to overthrow President de Gaulle47.
 43 P. Żytnicki, T. Nyczka, J. Leśniewska, “Muzułmanie przeciwko terroryzmowi”, Gazeta Wy-
borcza 2015, 30.11, p. 5.
 44 A. Poczobut, “Walka z terroryzmem wzmacnia dyktatorów”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 28–29.11, 
p. 17.
 45 A. Stankiewicz, “PiS apeluje o zamknięcie granic”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 16.11, p. A7.
 46 T. Targański, op. cit., pp. 64–66.
 47 M. Nowicki, “Paryż w stanie wojennym”, op. cit., p. 64.
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Cultural and social contexts
In his statement which has already resonated throughout the continent, Konrad 
Szymański, the expected new Polish minister for European affairs, stated that after 
the Paris attacks he sees no political possibility of Poland accepting any immigrants 
based on previous EU arrangements. And even though Szymański later tempered his 
words, the immigrant – terrorist association has permanently entered the political 
main stream48.
During a recent demonstration on Polish Independence Day, he [doctor Ziad Abou 
Saleh from Syria] felt uneasy about such a scene: a sea of white-and-red flags and 
among them a banner stating: Polska dla Polaków (Poland for the Poles). “I have 
been living in Poland for over 30 years and nothing like that has ever happened here. 
It began during the election campaign when a considerable portion of the politicians 
spoke terribly of refugees only to increase their poll ratings. And thus they conceded 
to the youth going through the streets and freely, without any moral dilemma, saying 
that Poland should be white and Catholic,” argued Dr. Abou Saleh49.
The article entitled “Islamska emigracja z Francji” discussed the anti-Muslim 
tendencies in France based on the accounts of Stowarzyszenie przeciwko Islamo-
fobii (Association Against Islamophobia)50.
 In the context of anti-Muslim attitudes, Jacek Hołub discussed in Gazeta 
Wyborcza the position of the Radio Maryja radio station:
The topic of the menacing Muslim “illegal immigrants” ousted from Radio Maryja’s 
banners its main slogan: the fight against the “gender ideology.” Now, a day before 
the 24th anniversary of the station, which will be celebrated on Saturday in Toruń, the 
Redemptorist [fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk – translator’s remark] has a new enemy. It is the 
“liberal multicultural ideology”, the political proponents of which have led to the set-
tling in the west of Europe millions of Muslims and they want to accept even more51.
Jerzy Haszyczński posed a question regarding European civil liberties in the 
context of the Paris terrorist attacks:
Once again we are faced with a dilemma in our fight against terror: how far can one 
dispense with Western freedom and values to increase security and eliminate the 
 48 M. Ostrowski, J. Winiecki, Ł. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 8.
 49 R. Kim, E. Lis, “Wcześniej się nie zdarzyło”, op. cit., p. 34.
 50 M. Rębała, “Islamska emigracja z Francji”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 11.12, p. 21.
 51 J. Hołub, “Teraz islamizacja”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 05.12–06.12, p. 6.
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threats? Also, to what extent can one dispense with the principles, such as freedom 
of movement, which apply in the EU, where a leading Member State was ruthlessly 
attacked?52
Religious context
After the 9/11 attacks, there appeared a category of “Arabs” in CBOS surveys regard-
ing the attitude of Poles towards other nations. From that moment on Arabs, inter-
changeably with the Romani, have been the least liked national group – reminded 
Dr Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, specialist on Islam at the Warsaw School of Eco-
nomics. However, she did note that regardless of the aversion to Muslims, Islamo-
phobic slogans remained for a long time a fringe issue: “Now, they have reached the 
main stream, they have become a rational, sanctioned voice in the dispute on Islam”53.
In an article entitled “Terroryści w Brukseli”, Jacek Pawlicki discussed how 
jihadists perceived their own situation while living in Europe:
“Those people perceive themselves as the victims of discrimination and racism,” 
explained Montasser AlDe’emeh in an interview with a Belgian newspaper. The 
Jordan-born Palestinian living in Molenbeek is a recognised researcher of Belgian 
Islamic movements. He argued that for many years they have been recruiting young 
people from the fringes of Belgian society. ISIS’s message which reaches young 
Muslims via social media or through their colleagues is simple: in Belgium, you are 
nobody, in Syria you can be heroes and Mujahideen (holy warriors)54.
In an article entitled “Dżihadistan”, Michał Kacewicz extensively discussed 
the nature of Islamic State and its members:
They manufacture their own gold coins, they pay our pensions, they possess a pro-
prietary intelligence, and a 100,000-strong army. They finance jihad from ransom, 
and trading oil and stolen works of art. […] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (which means 
“originally from Baghdad”), the leader of Islamic State, wears black robes during 
official events reminiscent of the historical dress of Sunni rulers. But on an everyday 
basis, he wears a field uniform and is surrounded by bodyguards. He is constantly on 
the move. He does not use a cellular phone or the internet. Eighteen months ago he 
 52 J. Haszczyński, “Dżihadyści uderzyli w zachodni styl życia”, Rzeczpospolita 2015, 16.11, p. A6.
 53 R. Kim, E. Lis, “Wcześniej się nie zdarzyło”, op. cit., p. 3.
 54 J. Pawlicki, op. cit., p. 74.
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assumed the title of caliph Ibrahim – for Sunnis it was an important symbol of the re-
vival of the caliphate, i.e. the great homeland of all Muslims. He controls over 80,000 
sq. km of Syria and Iraq, an area which is inhabited by 8 million subjects. Emulating 
the long-gone rulers, he established the Muslim council, which is similar to a govern-
ment and a judicial tribunal. It has ministries and field administration. […] By bring-
ing back the notion of Arabic unity, the self-appointed caliph gained the sympathy 
of those communities which have never been that radical. Islamic State has received 
the support of both officers of the former Iraqi army of Saddam Hussein, and young 
Syrian revolutionaries. The former are frustrated in that after the American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 they lost their privileged position, particularly when the invaders gave 
the rule to Shias. The latter saw in Islamic State an efficient organisation capable of 
defeating the dictator. Even more so since jihadists managed to eliminate the banditry 
which had been raging for a long time in the seized territories. “Syrian and Iraqi 
peasants were relieved to welcome Islamic State’s arrival, as it offered relative peace 
and order in the seized territories,” said Olivier Hanne. The price for peace was the 
introduction of sharia (Islamic law) and brutal removal of any forms of resistance. 
In the centre of Syrian Raqqa, the Islamists’ stronghold, horrific spectacles of the 
crucifixion of people suspected of espionage are organised. Women are stoned for 
having a Facebook account, and homosexuals are thrown off of roof tops. The streets 
are patrolled by Muslim police units, including the female al-Chansa brigade, making 
sure,e.g. women are not using any prohibited contraceptives. However, healthcare 
and schools do work, though children learn there only the principles of Islam and its 
history. Social aid is paid out (e.g. a 10-dollar benefit for every child)55.
The reported events together with new information regarding the circum-
stances of the attacks were organised and interpreted in a more comprehensive 
context in the analysed periodicals. In the first issue of Newsweek Polska, i.e. 
47/2015, after the bomb attacks, it was not specified who had been responsible 
for them: “When we were closing this issue of Newsweek, we still did not know 
the final number of casualties. Unknown perpetrators fired automatic firearms in 
several locations throughout the city”56. Only the following issue of the weekly in-
cluded the more comprehensive context of the attacks. Gazeta Wyborcza provided 
details of the investigation on an on-going basis: “The investigation into the Paris 
attacks offers new details sporadically. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, their mastermind, 
not only participated in them, but even returned to the crime scene”57; “Belgians 
are still on the hunt for Salah Abdeslam – the only jihadist who survived the ter-
rorist attacks in Paris. And President François Hollande is trying to put together 
 55 M. Kacewicz, op. cit., pp. 75–76.
 56 [editorial board], op. cit., p. 4.
 57 P. Moszyński, “Co planowali terroryści…”, op. cit., p. 11.
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a coalition against Islamic State”58. Regular updates particularly referred to infor-
mation regarding those responsible for conducting the attacks (contacts with the 
Belgian Molenbeek ghetto):
Last Monday, armoured Belgian police vehicles once again took to the streets of Mo-
lenbeek, and fully armed police special forces leapt with machine guns over balconies 
and roofs. Despite the show of force, they were unable to apprehend the 26-year-old 
Salah Adbelslam, the only Paris attacker still living. His brother Ibrahim blew him-
self up in the Paris Boulevard Voltaire, while Salah managed to return to Brussels. 
[…] It is hardly a surprise for anyone that Salah returned to his borough. According 
to Bilal Benyaich, a Belgian expert on radical Islam: “Molenbeek is a place where 
you can disappear easily.” That is the location of the majority of the blank spots of 
Brussels, where the police rarely venture, and which are ruled by drug gangs and 
arms dealers. He went on to explain that Molenbeek had not become the centre of 
European jihad without a reason. It is the perfect operating base: from the centrally 
located Brussels, it is close to all the major capitals of the West. It possesses a strong 
ideological centre – 22 mosques plus several underground prayer houses, where 
Salafi imams preach. In the flourishing black market, it is easy to acquire an AK-47 
and ammunition. Benyaich is certain that if you know on which door to knock, you 
can buy an AK-47 for 500–1,000 euros. The firearms were smuggled in the 1990s to 
Belgium from the Balkans via Germany…59
After almost every jihadist attack in Europe it turns out that some evidence leads to 
the Brussels borough of Molenbeek. That is also the case now – several suspects have 
just been arrested there in relation to the Paris attacks60.
Newspapers and magazines also included interpretations questioning the 
sense of fighting terrorism61. There also appeared the topic of supporting the anti-
jihadist coalition62.
 58 T. Bielecki, “Paryż szuka sojuszników”, op. cit., p. 12.
 59 J. Pawlicki, op. cit., p. 72.
 60 T. Bielecki, “Modny adres bohemy i dżihadystów”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 17.11, p. 11.
 61 “The Paris daily Le Monde included a series of opinions of acclaimed philosophers: Jürgen 
Habermas noted that Geogre Bush’s version of the ‘war on terror’ damaged the political and men-
tal condition of American society. Frédéric Gross warned that the war with terrorism should not 
lead to submitting to the ‘logic of fear and hatred’. He made an appeal to maintain civil vigilance 
regarding police rights” ([editorial board], “Wolność na wojnie”, Polityka 2015, Issue 48, 25.11–
01.12, p. 5).
 62 “The anti-jihadist coalition is growing in strength. The United Kingdom intends to join the 
bombings of Syria, while Germany wants to send up to 1,200 troops on a mission to fight Islamic 
State” (R. Stefanicki, “Brytyjczycy idą na wojnę za Paryż”, Gazeta Wyborcza 2015, 03.12, p. 13); 
From the neighbouring Belgium to which he fled after the attacks, news is coming in about a search 
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Conclusions
In my case study, I found no social acceptance or legitimisation on the part 
of the media of the terrorist acts performed in Paris on 13 November 2015. The 
analysed Polish periodicals successfully fulfilled the objectives of a primary and 
secondary media outlet respecting the two main principles of journalistic ethics: 
the truth principle and the objectivity principle. That was confirmed by the quan-
titative and qualitative analyses. The reader was informed about what happened 
on 13 Nov 2015 in the capital of France. The terrorist attacks were discussed 
in various interpretative frames. The journalistic presentation of the events cov-
ered the political, historical, cultural, social, and religious contexts. The extensive 
overview of the topic of jihad was supplemented by texts helping readers under-
stand how the members of the Islamic State terrorist organisation perceive their 
mission. It is noteworthy, that out of the 109 texts which met the methodological 
criteria of the analysis, none appeared prior to 13 November 2015.
The conducted study confirmed the journalists’ efforts to ensure reliable 
reports on the facts in seeking the truth of the events of 13 Nov 2015 (answers 
to questions: what happened in Paris on 13 Nov 2015, who committed the at-
tack, when the acts of terror occurred, where did they occur, why the attacks 
were committed) offering a diverse interpretative spectrum and a wide research 
horizon.
The undertaken analysis proved the grave role of the mass media in terrorist 
organisations’ political communication. The categories of truth and objectivity 
used by the publishers are essential for the proper understanding of the core of the 
communication.
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Fulfilling the journalistic principles of truth and objectivity in the context 
of mediatisation of political communication – the terrorist attacks in Paris 
in November 2015
(Summary)
The mediatisation of political communication indicates two main functions of the mass me-
dia: they report on events from the world of politics and create the images of political actors in the 
eyes of the public. I attempt to answer the question: can one talk about respecting the basic princi-
ples of journalistic ethics (the truth and the objectivity principles) in the times of the mediatisation 
of the public sphere? The theme of the article applies to terrorism, which is a form of political 
communication, having its own special expression. The activities of terrorist organisations influ-
ence the actions of the leaders of political life, citizens and the mass media. The research material 
consisted of Polish opinion-making weeklies Newsweek Polska and Polityka and national dailies 
in their printed versions: Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. The time frame covered a period 
from 1 November 2015 to 11 December 2015. The topic of the article was treated as a case study.
Keywords: mass media, mediatisation, politics, truth, objectivity, communication.
